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1 Introduction
Insurance provision is constrained by asymmetric information. Obviously, more insurance de-
creases incentives to reduce the probability of bad outcomes by exerting unobservable effort.
This moral hazard problem becomes more severe when agents not only privately choose effort
but also hiddenly own assets that, in anonymous competitive equilibrium, trade at prices that
neglect the effect of insurance on effort incentives.
Pauly (1974) uses first-order conditions to characterize this source of inefficiency when in-
surance is traded against a single event, so that only one asset position is private information.
In that setting, Bertola and Koeniger (2013) derive functional form restrictions ensuring valid-
ity of that “first-order approach.” Ábrahám, Koehne and Pavoni (2011) similarly establish that
first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient, under sensible and interpretable functional
restrictions, in an economywith exclusive formal insurance and a single hiddennon-contingent
asset.
In this note we show that the method of these papers is not fruitful if agents can trade mul-
tiple hidden assets. This finding is not only a technicality since those and other recent papers
build on the classic approach of Rogerson (1985) to establish validity of the first-order approach
in moral hazard models. The case of multiple hidden assets is a natural extension of this ex-
isting literature, which is motivated by a general concern about asset observability that is not
restricted to a single asset.
2 The problem
We assume that privately chosen effort e determines a non-degenerate probability distribution
f(zije) for observable income realizations zi, i = 1; :::; n, with 0 < f(zije) < 1.1 It will be useful
below to index zi in increasing order, z1 < z2 < ::: < zn 1 < zn. Ex-ante identical individuals de-
rive disutility  v(e) from exerting effort and enjoy expected utility Eu(c) =Pni=1 u(c(zi))f(zije)
from consumption of c(zi) upon realization of income zi. To focus on the interior optima that
1In this setting a non-exclusive market can be active for trade in securities contingent on idiosyncratic realizations
(the sale of securities is non-exclusive since agents can purchase securities from more than one provider). If instead
observable outcomes are a deterministic function of effort choices based on privately observed ability realizations, as
in the hidden-information economies analyzed byMirrlees (1971) or Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), private information
rules out trade in non-exclusive contingent securities (Golosov and Tsyvinski 2007, appendix A).
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may be characterized by first-order conditions, we assume that v0(0) = 0 and that consumption
c can vary freely along the budget constraint.2
Atomistic individuals maximize the objective function
V (e; fq(zi)gni=1) =  v(e) +
nX
i=1
u(c(zi))f(zije) (1)
for c(zi) = zi + q(zi) 
nX
j=1
q(zj)p(zj),
where q(zj) denotes the (positive or negative) quantity held of a security that pays a unit of
consumption upon realization of income zj , and is traded at a price p(zj), j = 1; :::; n that is not
influenced by each individual’s choices.
The notation can accommodate non-contingent assets in amultiple-period economywhere
consumption and income are indexed by time aswell as random realizations. For example, if for
some j = N it is the case that p(zN ) = (1 + r)
 1
r and f(zN je) = 1=, then the return of this asset
does not depend on the income realization. The individual can then allocate some resources to
first-period consumption (when utility is weighted by an inverse discount factor rather than
a probability, and a non-random endowment may be available) rather than to second-period
consumption.
The first-order approach is valid if the objective function (1) is concave. If effort decreases
welfare at a non-decreasing rate,
[A1] v0(e) > 0, v00(e)  0 8 e > 0;
and the utility function u(c) is strictly concave in consumption,
[A2] u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0 8 c;
it is straightforward to establish concavity when there is no moral hazard:
Remark 1 If f(zije) = f(zi) for all i, then assumptions [A1] and [A2] suffice to ensure concavity
of the objective function (1) in effort e and the quantities fq(zi)gni=1.
Concavity, of course, follows immediately from the fact that the objective function is a linear
combination of concave transformations of linear functions. It is however useful in what fol-
2A non-negativity constraint on consumption is not imposed, or is not binding because the marginal utility of con-
sumption diverges to infinity at zero.
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lows to refer to a more detailed proof (in the Appendix) that explicitly proves concavity exploit-
ing block-diagonality in effort and security quantities of the objective function’s Hessian when
probabilities are exogenously given, and showing that theHessian of a function thatmaps to the
real line a linear combination of variables is negative definite when that function is concave.
3 Establishing concavity undermoral hazard
Remark 1’s detailed derivation of a fairly obvious result highlights the problems arising when
probabilities depend on effort. Even when effort costs are linearly separable in the objective
function, if f(zije) depends on e it does not appear possible to replicate the steps of Remark
1’s proof and characterize in full generality how the form of the model’s primitive functions
bears on negative definiteness of theHessian of (1). Doing sowould be exceedingly complicated
when not only moral hazard prevents the objective function from being a linear combination
of concave functions, but also hidden asset positions appear among the function’s arguments.
While Jewitt (1988) shows how functional restrictions can establish concavity with respect to
effort choices in moral hazard problems without hidden assets, such a direct approach is very
cumbersome when derivatives with respect to asset quantities also appear in the Hessian of a
multivariate objective function.
Adopting the approach of Rogerson (1985) instead, one may rewrite (1) as
 v(e) +
nX
i=1
u(c(zi))f(zije) =  v(e) + u(c(zn)) +
n 1X
i=1
f(zije) (u(c(zi))  u(c(zn)))
=  v(e) + u(c(zn)) 
n 1X
i=1
F (zije)(u(c(zi+1))  u(c(zi))), (2)
where F is the cumulative distribution function. It follows from [A1], [A2], and linearity of c(zn)
in fq(zi)gni=1 that v(e) + u(c(zn)) is concave in e and fq(zi)gni=1. Thus, it would suffice to estab-
lish concavity of the weighted sum of utility differences that appear in (2).
To characterize a summation of products of probability and utility functions, it is poten-
tially useful to make assumptions about the form of these functions. As in Ábrahám, Koehne
and Pavoni (2011) and Bertola and Koeniger (2013), a promising restriction for the distribution
function is
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[A3] F (zije) is log-convex in effort.
This is a stronger restriction than the convexity assumption that in Rogerson (1985) suffices to
prove concavity of the objective function in the absence of hidden assets when [A2] holds and
the likelihood ratio of f(zije) is monotone.3 Should restrictions on the form of the utility func-
tion that are stronger than [A2] ensure log-convexity of u(c(zi+1))   u(c(zi)), when consump-
tion levels are influenced by hidden asset positions, then [A3] implies that the terms in the last
summation above are convex (because log-convexity is preserved inmultiplication and implies
convexity), and concave when entering the objective function with a minus sign.
4 A negative result
Log-convexity of u(c(zi+1))   u(c(zi)) requires convexity. Unfortunately, no further restriction
on the form of the utility function can ensure convexity of the utility differences across two
realizations when the relevant contingent consumption levels depend on holdings of additional
non-redundant assets, as is the case in any economywithmore than two possible contingencies
and securities, and/or multiple periods and non-contingent assets:
Proposition 1 If c(zi) and c(zj) depend on multiple non-redundant assets, u (c(zi))   u (c(zj))
cannot be convex in asset quantities when [A2] holds.
Focusing on the counterpart in this context of the crucial step in Remark 1’s proof, the proof
of Proposition 1 (in the Appendix) inspects the Hessian of u (c(zi))   u (c(zj)). The proof shows
formally that if (along with securities contingent on the two realizations zi and zj) any other
security is traded at a strictly positive price, its quantity can vary contingent consumption lev-
els in positive or negative directions, making it impossible to characterize the curvature of the
difference u (c(zi))  u (c(zj)) between two concave functions.
For an additional security to have a strictly positive equilibriumprice, its payoff should be re-
alized in some other contingency or period k 6= i; j. Hence, the negative result applies when the
number of possible realizations exceeds two. Should only two income realizations be possible
in the period in which income and security payoffs are realized, the portfolio problem would
3The condition of a monotone likelihood ratio requires that (@f(zije)=@e) =f(zije) be non-decreasing in zi which
has the natural interpretation that more effort increases output on average (see Rogerson, 1985, and his references).
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feature an additional non-redundant asset (as well as a contingent insurance asset) if hidden
savings can non-contingently move resources along the economy’s time dimension.
5 The single-hidden-asset case
When the objective function is not concave, the first-order conditions are not sufficient for an
optimum, because double deviations in effort and assets can improve welfare. In models with
a single hidden asset, it is possible to formulate functional form conditions that, together with
[A3], ensure that the first-order conditions are sufficient as well necessary.
If only a non-contingent bond is hidden, deviations in savings move consumption levels
in the same direction for all realizations zi. (Log-)convexity of the utility differences is then
ensured by non-increasing absolute risk aversion in the two-periodmodel of Ábrahám, Koehne
and Pavoni (2011) who assume exclusive insurance so that positions in contingent assets are
controlled by the principal.
In a model with two realizations z1 = z2   , where  > 0 is the size of a single negative
shock covered by non-exclusive insurance, Bertola and Koeniger (2013) show that the concavity
of u (c(z2)) is dominated by convexity of  u (c(z1)) if absolute risk aversion is decreasing and
insurance is sufficiently incomplete, i.e., the asset quantity is in (0;). The latter condition
is satisfied at the optimum if insurance is actuarially unfair enough and implies large enough
differences in consumption c(z2) and c(z1), and thus also in utility.
The functional form restrictions proposed in these papers rule out optimality of joint devia-
tions in savings and effort, and insurance and effort, respectively. They do not suffice, however,
to rule out optimality of joint deviations in multiple assets, such as deviations in hidden insur-
ance and savings. Intuitively, joint deviations in contingent and non-contingent hidden assets
can remain attractive even when sensible curvature conditions rule out optimality of joint de-
viations in effort and non-contingent hidden asset quantities. Decreasing risk aversion helps
to make such deviations less attractive, but lower (higher) savings and higher (lower) insurance
may well increase welfare, to imply that an attractive double deviation cannot be ruled out.
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6 Conclusions
In problems with moral hazard and hidden assets, the objective function need not be concave
in effort and portfolio choices, and first-order conditions may not be sufficient for optimality.
This note has shown that recent progress on this issue relies heavily on a key simplification.
The functional form restrictions of Ábrahám, Koehne and Pavoni (2011) establish validity of
the first-order approach in a two-period economy with hidden effort and non-contingent sav-
ings. Bertola and Koeniger (2013) provide similarly plausible and appealing conditions for an
economy with hidden insurance against a single contingency, as in Pauly (1974). In an even
mildlymore complex and realistic economy, where both non-contingent savings and insurance
against a single contingent event are hidden, such restrictions do not suffice to prove validity
of the first-order approach building on the approach of Rogerson (1985). Further work may
explore, perhaps following the approach of Jewitt (1988), whether other functional restrictions
can ensure validity of the first-order approach in economies with multiple contingencies and
hidden assets.
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Appendix
Proof of Remark 1
If each of the additive terms in (1) is concave, then this is also true of the objective function.
Assumption [A1] implies that  v(e) is concave. To establish concavity ofPni=1 u(c(zi))f(zi) we
show that itsHessianwith respect to the elements of fq(zi)gni=1 is negative definite. The Jacobian
of
Pn
i=1 u(c(zi))f(zi)with respect to the elements of fq(zi)gni=1 is
nX
i=1
u(c(zi))f(zi) (Izi   p) (3)
where Izi is the i
th column of the identity matrix, and p is the vector of security prices in terms
of the numeraire. The Hessian of
Pn
i=1 u(c(zi))f(zi) with respect to the elements of fq(zi)gni=1 is
the sum of the Hessians of u(c(zj))with respect to all elements of fq(zi)gni=1,
u00(c(zj))
 
Izj   p
  
Izj   p
T
, (4)
weighted by the square of the probability weight:
nX
i=1
u00(c(zi))f(zi)2 (Izi   p) (Izi   p)T . (5)
By assumption [A2] all diagonal terms of (5) are negative, and the leading principal minors of
(5)
Mj =
 
jY
i=1
u00(c(zi))f(zi)2
! 
1 
jX
i=1
p(zi)
!2
are negative for j odd and positive for j even. Hence,
Pn
i=1 u(c(zi))f(zi) is concave in fq(zi)gni=1.
Proof of Proposition 1
The consumption levels contingent on realizations zi and zj depend on quantities of secu-
rities that pay off contingent on those realizations, as well as of securities that pay off in other
realizations zk, k 6= i; j. To show that availability of a contingent payoff for another realization
zk makes it impossible to establish convexity or concavity of u (c(zi))  u (c(zj)), we write
c(zi) = zi + q(zi)  q(zj)p(zj)  q(zk)p(zk) 
X
l 6=j;k
q(zl)p(zl);
c(zj) = zj + q(zj)  q(zj)p(zj)  q(zk)p(zk) 
X
l 6=j;k
q(zl)p(zl).
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For positive definiteness, all the leading principal minors of the Hessian of the utility difference
u(c(zi))  u(c(zj))with respect to the securities fq(zi)gni=1 should be positive. To prove Proposi-
tion 1 it is thus sufficient to show that the principal minor of the Hessian for a utility difference
u(c(zi))   u(c(zj)) with respect to q(zj) and q(zk) is negative for any utility function as in [A2].
The Jacobian is
Ju(c(zi)) u(c(zj)) =
264  p(zj)u0 (c(zi))  (1  p(zj))u0 (c(zj))
 p(zk)u0 (c(zi)) + p(zk)u0 (c(zj))
375
and the Hessian is
Hu(c(zi)) u(c(zj))
=
264 p(zj)2u00 (c(zi))  (1  p(zj))2u00 (c(zj)) p(zk)p(zj)u00 (c(zi)) + p(zk)(1  p(zj))u00 (c(zj))
p(zk)p(zj)u
00 (c(zi)) + p(zk)(1  p(zj))u00 (c(zj)) p(zk)2u00 (c(zi))  p(zk)2u00 (c(zj))
375
= u00 (c(zi))
264 p(zj)2 p(zk)p(zj)
p(zk)p(zj) p(zk)
2
375  u00 (c(zj))
264 (1  p(zj))2  p(zk)(1  p(zj))
 p(zk)(1  p(zj)) p(zk)2
375 .
The principal minor (the determinant of the Hessian) is
 u00 (c(zi))u00 (c(zj)) p(zk)2
and cannot be positive, as would be required for convexity of the utility difference u (c(zi))  
u (c(zj)), when u00 (c(zi)) < 0 as in [A2] and p(zk) > 0.
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